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Abstract 
The most obvious pattern of African post-colonial States revolves around 
Hegel’s theory of State as the ultimate objectification or self-projection of 
the Absolute Spirit in which the drivers of government policies are 
superior to the people. This paper investigated and outlined the 
consequences and the remedy to this Hegel’s foundation of African States 
and emphasized the necessity for sustainable development to become the 
goal of those in the position of power in Africa. The remedy is located in 
the reconstruction of the concept of State in Africa with the purpose of 
producing a State that integrates the people into its policies and pursues 
development ideology that is people-oriented. This paper placed the 
responsibility of service and respect for the voices of the demos (the 
people) on the political leaders and their bureaucratic counterparts and 
recommended the provision of a viable socio-eco-political platform for the 
realization of the holistic development in Africa.  
Keywords: Hegel, state, reconstruction, sustainable development, good 
governance, absolute spirit 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The definition and the purpose of the State have assumed a controversial 
dimension long before the modern theorists emerged. Like every social-political 
concept, the State had a long line of theorists trying to delineate its existence as a 
central concept in the region of human existence. It is important we run a brief 
analysis on classical scholars’ thoughts on the purpose of the State before we 
officially subject Hegel’s concept of State to serious interrogation. For instance, 
both Plato and Aristotle held that the State exists to procure the good life for the 
citizens. Aristotle conceived the State as having an ethical dimension, which is the 
provision of the platform for man to enjoy the good or happy life. Happiness is the 
goal of every man. If man does anything evil, for Aristotle, it’s with the view of 
deriving some form of happiness from the evil. ‘Happiness, therefore, being found 
to be something final and self-sufficient, is the end at which all actions aim’ 
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(Aristotle, 1962). The actions of the State also must aim at the happiness of its 
citizens. 
But for scholars like Hobbes (1946) and Locke (1952), the State is a 
product of the peoples’ willingness to transcend the state of nature, which inhibits 
the possibility of a peaceful co-existence. In Hobbes (1946), the state of nature is 
reputable for brutality and violence, while in Locke (1952), it is a state of peaceful 
co-existence through the guidance of the moral laws, but with the possibility of 
violence due to man’s moral weaknesses. 
The State is the highest form of association that allows the realization of 
man’s project of self-fulfillments. This definition is traceable to the ancient 
political philosophers’ conception of the polis (the State) as the moral ground for 
the attainment of man’s rational goal and as a product of natural necessity, which 
will enhance man’s meaningful living. In other words, the State is not just a willing 
transition from the State of nature but a natural phenomenon; a human necessity 
built on the natural nature of man as a political animal. Aristotle (1962) argued that 
man is by nature a political animal. This implies that man is intended by nature to 
live within the purview of his society, which is the collection of his fellow men. 
The family is the fundamental unit established by nature to cater for man’s 
immediate needs. But because of the unlimited nature of man’s needs, a higher 
form of association was necessary. According to Aristotle, the village emerged as 
the first association of a number of houses for the satisfaction of something more 
than daily needs. The dynamic nature of man’s needs resulted in the highest form 
of human association, which is the State. Thus, the Aristotelian State exists 
primarily to cater for the endless needs of man in the society. The State has no 
other justification for its existence than the provision of a viable means of man’s 
realization of his goal. 
The sovereign has only three duties to attend to: the duty of protecting 
society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; the duty of 
protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from the injustice or 
opposition of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact 
administration of justice; and the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public 
works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any 
individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain because the profit 
yielded would never repay the expense to any individual or small number of 
individuals, although it might frequently do much more than repay a great society 
(Smith, 1937, cited in Appadorai, 1975). By the sovereign, Adam Smith meant the 
State. The State is to prevent external aggression against its own unique and 
authentic existence. It should ensure justice in all interpersonal relationships within 
it. In other words, no member of the State should impoverish, exploit and oppress 
the others, unjustly. Also, the State and its institutions of governance and 
administration should not only service the need of some minority (those in power). 
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They should rather be used to enhance the profitability of the whole society at 
large.  
Max Weber’s (1972) definition of the State ‘as a human political 
community that has a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory’ (cited in Irele, 1998) becomes problematic. If our conception of the 
State is in terms of physical use of force alone, whether legitimate or illegitimate, 
then the danger of the tyrannical usage of the State’s power of governance becomes 
a possibility in any polity. The Weberian conception of the ‘State’ in terms of 
legitimate use of physical force, alone, could lead to a problem due to the moral 
weaknesses of men. This physical force has the tendencies of being used by 
tyrannical leaders to the detriment of the lives of the citizens. Laski (1967) said, 
concerning the State, that it becomes an organization for enabling the mass of men 
to realize social good on the largest possible scale. The State enables the 
individuals within its jurisdiction to realize and achieve social goods. For these 
scholars, the State exists for certain ends or, put in another form, the State is the 
means to an end which is the self-fulfillment, self-realization, and self-development 
of man in the society. 
Hegel, who forms the basis of our discourse, projects an idea of the State 
that exists as an end itself. The State in Hegel’s political thought evolves as the 
supreme body in the society. The destruction of such projection becomes a 
necessity in our modern time. This is because Hegel’s conception of ‘the State’, in 
the hand of despotic leaders, will inhibit both national and individual developments 
of the citizens. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This study employed qualitative method. Qualitative study refers to the 
method which relies on text and image data. An intellectual engagement with 
Hegel’s political thought calls for a unique and rigorous method of textual analysis 
of his political ideas through a discursive method as paraphernalia of qualitative 
method of research. This is due to the nature of Political Theory as a branch of 
Political Science that relies on analysis, critical evaluation and logic.  
 
THE STATE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Given the peculiar nature of the State as the center of governance and the 
unification of the society, the idea of development, as well as sustainable 
development, cannot be discussed without the State being a central player. 
Development is not just infrastructural, but it is also human-focused. 
Kayode (2002:31) underscored it thus: 
 
Development is not just to make the poor wealthy, but to make the 
poor productive. The need of the poor…is not relief but the release 
of their inherent potential for individual growth, enhanced 
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productivity and higher social and political responsibility. This 
way, development turns man into an asset, not a liability. 
 
Thus, the State is supposed to focus on the developments of its people. In 
other words, the State ought to provide a conducive environment for the citizens’ 
realization of their dreams, aspirations and projections.   
Markandya (1990) posited thus: 
What constitutes development depends on what social goals are being 
advocated by the development agency, government, analyst or adviser. We take 
development to be a sector of desirable social objective… The elements of this 
sector might [be]: 
 Increase in real income per capita; 
 Improvement in health and nutritional status; 
 Educational achievement; 
 Access to resources; 
 A fairer distribution of income; and 
 Increase in basic freedoms 
The pursuit of these ideals of sustainable development is the goal of an 
ideal State (a proper State) whose citizens’ welfare guides the formulation and 
implementation of all policies and laws. Any State that does not focus on 
development as its priority could be said to fall within the purview of the Hegel’s 
State that occupies our attention.  
Reflecting on the character of the African States and their agenda for 
sustainable development, Ake (2001) succinctly stated that the problem is not so 
much that development has failed, as that it was never really on the agenda in the 
first place. By all indications, political conditions in Africa are the greatest 
impediment to development. 
Thus, the absence of development in Africa can be located in the absence 
of the ideal political leadership that could use the forces and the resources of the 
State to spawn viable development. The State, in the hands of corrupt political 
leaders, becomes a predator and a supreme entity whose policies are meant 
primarily for the minute elites, who control it without recourse to the undeniable 
existence of the teaming masses. 
Elliot (1999: 9) defined sustainable development in terms of: 
A political system that secures effective citizen participation in decision 
making; 
An economic system that provides for solutions for the tensions arising 
from disharmonious development; 
 A production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological 
base for development; 
A technological system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and 
finance; 
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An international system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and 
finance; 
An administrative system that is flexible and has the capacity for self-
correction. 
He argued that sustainable development is about reconciling development 
and the environmental resources on which society depends. Therefore, we can posit 
that the State has the responsibility of channeling the resources within its territory 
to promote developmental projects for the benefit of the larger society.  
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) defined 
sustainable development as the development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
This implied that sustainable development entails maintaining development over 
time, focusing on the unborn generations. Therefore, the present African States 
must begin to redress their ideological base in order to accommodate the prima 
facie tenets of sustainable development.  
 
THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF HEGEL’S POLITICAL 
THEORY 
However, in order to be able to do justice to Hegel’s concept of the State, 
there is a need to understand the metaphysical foundation of his theory.  For Hegel, 
the whole universe is the self-projection, self-externalization, self-manifestation, 
and self-development of the Absolute Spirit. The Absolute Spirit is the grand 
finale, the ultimate, and the totality of all beings. It is the unification of all that 
exist in this world of material experience. The appearance of man on earth signified 
the highest projection of the Absolute Spirit. When man comes to know the 
Absolute through reason, it is simply the Absolute that has come to know itself 
through man. The self-development of the Absolute is through the dialectical 
process, which entails the synthesizing of conflicts and contradictions into a new 
form. A thesis is negated by an antithesis. Both form a synthesis which, in itself, 
contains another thesis and antithesis. This process continues, for Hegel, as the 
order of change and transformation in the society.  
In projecting itself in the form of material or physical universe, the 
Absolute negated itself by being a spirit. The Absolute is the unification of both 
spirit and matter and takes different dimensions within the cosmic process of 
development through the logic of dialectics. The Absolute reaches its highest 
development in the emergence of the State as the supreme will of the Absolute 
Spirit. The State is the highest externalization of the Absolute Spirit.  
Hegel’s metaphysics does not accommodate duality in nature. All is 
encompassed within the whole. Everything in the world is a manifestation of the 
Absolute. The known and knower, consciousness and its objects, the finite and the 
infinite are all moments in the dialectic process of the Absolute. Nothing in the 
universe is self-contained. World history is the history of the development of the 
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Absolute. Different civilizations in the world’s history are all products of the stages 
in the development of the Absolute. From early civilization of the east, to the 
Roman Empire and to the German civilization in Hegel’s time are all the 
developmental stages of the dialectic moments of the Absolute’s self-projections. 
The State emerged as the material representatives of the Absolute in subordinating 
the wills of the individual to the universal will of the Absolute Spirit. The 
individuals have no concrete objective wills different from the universal will of the 
Absolute represented by the State. The freedom of the individuals is subordinated 
to the supreme will of the State. 
 
HEGEL’S THEORY OF THE STATE 
Hegel (1967) posited that ‘the State is the actuality of the ethical idea. It is 
ethical mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to self, knowing and 
thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows and in so far as it knows it. The State 
exists immediately in custom, mediately in individual self-consciousness, 
knowledge, and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards 
the State, finds in the State, as its essence and the end-product of its activity, its 
substantive freedom’. The State, for Hegel, is the final projection of the Absolute 
and it embodies its own unique ethical life. The State is unique and supreme to the 
individuals within it. The State is the unification of the human beings. For him, the 
State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth. We must, therefore, worship the State 
as the manifestation of the divine on earth. The State is the march of God through 
the world. The Hegel’s State swallows up the theory of rational free citizenship as 
the central concept in any political settings. The citizens have no life or freedom of 
their own, except the one the State attests to. 
Hegel (1967) posited that ‘the State is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is 
the actuality of the substantial will, which it possesses in the particular self-
consciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its 
universality. This substantial unity is an absolute unmoved end in itself, in which 
freedom comes into its supreme right. On the other hand, this final end has 
supreme right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a member of the 
State’.   
The State has a supreme right and universal will against individual rights 
and wills. The Hegel’s State does not pay much respect to the rights and wills of 
the individuals. The State’s rights and wills supersede that of the individuals, not 
minding whether the State’s will is wrong or not. As a matter of fact, the Hegel’s 
State has no possibility of being wrong or pursuing the wrong kind of actions or 
policies, being that it is a direct objectification of the Absolute Spirit. The State is 
the ethical end of man in the society. The State is the mind or the Absolute on 
earth, directing the affairs of men according to its own unique, peculiar universal 
will, under which the individuals’ wills must subsume.  
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Since our discourse surrounds the idea of the State in Hegel’s political 
thought, we will take the liberty to extensively quote from Hegel’s major treatise 
on this matter of the State. Hegel argued that the State is the actuality of concrete 
freedom. But that concrete freedom consists in the fact that personal individuality 
and its particular interests will not only achieve their complete development and 
gain explicit recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and 
civil society), but also that they pass over their own accord into the interest of the 
universal, and, for another thing, they must know, resolve, and accept the universal 
as their end. Lastly, they must be active in the pursuit of the universal will. 
For Hegel, this implies that the universal does not prevail or achieve 
completion, except along with particular interests and through the co-operation of 
particular knowing and willing.  Individuals likewise do not live as private persons 
for their own ends alone and their activity is consciously aimed at the universal 
end. Hegel notes that the principle of modern States has enormous strength and 
depth. According to Hegel, this is because it allows the principle of subjectivity to 
progress to its culmination in the extreme of self-subsistent personal particularity, 
and yet, at the same time, brings it back to the substantive unity and so it maintains 
this unity in the principle of subjectivity, itself. 
The interpretation of this is that the State needs the collective existence of 
the people to authenticate its reality. However, their activity must be directed 
towards the realization of not just their own freedom, will, or aspirations, but rather 
the will and aspirations of the State. The modern States, for Hegel, seem to have 
given so much priority to individual freedom. For him, the State is the end of 
man’s existence. As the final stage in the development of the Absolute Spirit, the 
State’s universal will stands as the standard of operation in the society. Individuals’ 
will can only participate in the universal will of the State. 
 
HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF ROUSSEAU’S IDEA OF THE GENERAL WILL 
Rousseau’s (1968) postulation of the general will and the individual will 
stands as a contrast to Hegel’s. What Rousseau called the general will, Hegel 
referred to as the universal will. Like the other social contract theorists, Rousseau 
located sovereignty in the general body, which he conceived as the conglomeration 
of the individuals who have submitted their wills to form the general will. In other 
words, the citizens form the sovereign body, which must be obeyed. The peoples’ 
wills are integrated into the general will such that the people obey themselves in 
obeying the general will (or the sovereign body). This sovereign body operates like 
an association (assemblage of the citizens). 
Rousseau (1968) described the association as ‘a form of association which 
defends and protects the whole common force the person and the goods of each 
associate, and in which, each while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself 
alone and remain as free as before’. The main goal of the general will, by 
implication of the State, is the defense and the protection of peoples’ lives and 
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property. Man’s freedom is predicated on his submission to the general will, which 
empowers his own unique will. Freedom, therefore, implies conformity with the 
general will. Thus, a disassociation with the general will reverses the freedom of 
the individual. For Rousseau, the general will is nothing but the conglomerations of 
the individuals’ wills. It is the general will that illuminates and brings a meaningful 
sense of importance to the individual’s will.  
On the subject of sovereignty, Rousseau (1968) located it not in the 
administrators of the association or assembly, but rather in the people whose 
individual wills form the general will. He argued that the moment there is a master, 
there is no sovereign, and subsequently, the body politics is destroyed. The people 
are their own rulers through a conscious submission to the general will, which is 
the collection of their own wills. According to Hegel, sovereignty lies in the State 
as the supreme body of governance and not in the people. Given the peculiar nature 
of the State as the highest stage in the Absolute’s development, it holds the power 
of life and death as a representative of the Absolute.  
Hegel (1967) found fault with Rousseau’s postulations, which he captured 
thus: ‘The merit of Rousseau’s contribution to the research for a rational basis of 
the State is that by adducing the will as the principle of the State, he is adducing a 
principle which has thought both for its form and content, a principle indeed which 
is thinking itself….Unfortunately, however, as Fichte did later, he takes the will 
only in an indeterminate form as the individual will, and he regards the universal 
will not as the absolutely rational element in the will, but only as a ‘general’ will, 
which proceeds out of the individual will as out of conscious will’. 
For Hegel, contrary to Rousseau’s general will, the universal will is the 
living will of the political community. It is not the aggregate of the individual wills, 
but rather a supreme will under which individuals will must compulsorily 
participate. Rousseau’s general will is formed by the individuals’ wills, while the 
Hegel’s universal will has an objective existence as the self-projection or self-
objectification of the Absolute Spirit. The individuals who are also products of the 
dialectical developments of the Absolute must submit to the State as the highest 
stage of the Absolute’s self-manifestation in the material universe. 
Hegel (1967) posited that, ‘in contrast with the spheres of private rights 
and private welfare (the family and civil society), the State is, from one point of 
view, an external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is such that their 
laws and interests are subordinate to it and dependent on it. On the other hand, 
however, it is the end immanent within them, and its strength lies in the unity of its 
own universal end and aim with the particular interest of individuals, in the fact 
that individuals have duties to the State in proportion as they have rights against it’. 
The family and the civil society are the realms where men’s freedom and 
rights are mostly celebrated. In the State, the freedom of individual is subjected to 
the dictate of the State, given its nature as the end of both the family and the civil 
society. Individuality is the central figure in both the family and the civil society. 
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But in the State, the concept of individuality is subject to the State. This is because 
the family and the civil society are both stages in the development process of the 
Absolute and, at the emergence of the State, as the final stage of the objectification 
of the Absolute, both the family and the civil society and their inherent values, 
traditions, and customs must be subjected to the State. The moral values, for 
instance, in both the family and the civil society do not hold in relation to the State. 
The State possesses its own unique moral sense that it is in a higher dimension 
from those of the family and the civil society.  
 
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA IN THE HEGEL’S POLITICS 
The obvious problem in the Hegel’s State stares us in the face. The State, 
as a self-manifestation of the Absolute, carries within its bowel a magisterial 
prowess that is subject to no questioning or gives no room to the voice of dissent. 
The State organizes itself as the supreme body in the society whose law is 
subjected to no review because it is the final stage of the Absolute, who is a 
supreme coordinator of world history. The Absolute is a rational conscious being 
whose activities illuminate human history as the force of progress in the 
communities of the human race. The Absolute cannot be wrong as the totality and 
the unification of all beings; so the State that emerged out of it cannot be wrong in 
the implementations of its policies. The people should willingly throw themselves 
into the hands of the State as the final objectification of the infallible Absolute 
Spirit. Man’s freedom can only be realized in the State. The State is the only 
precondition of the attainment of individual ends and aspirations.  
Hegel (1953) posited that ‘the history of the world moves on a higher level 
than that proper to morality. The demands and accomplishments of the Absolute 
and the final aim of Spirit, the working of Providence, lie above the obligations, 
responsibilities, and liabilities, which are incumbent on the individuals in regard to 
their morality’.  According to him, the concept of morality, as conceived in the 
family and the civil society, is quite different from the State’s. The State is guided 
by its supreme moral sense, which is a derivative of the Absolute ideal of morality. 
The State, therefore, possesses its own unique morality that could be at variance 
with the private morality of the individual.  
The historical figures (leaders) are nothing but mere stooges in the hands 
of the Absolute, who is the primary force behind the development of world history. 
These historical figures, like Alexander the Great, Napoleon, Adolf Hitler, Benito 
Mussolini, and others, were weapons in the hands of the Absolute. The Absolute is 
also behind the emergence of some of the best leaders the world has ever known. 
George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nelson Mandela, 
and the rest were all handmaids of the Absolute.  
The implication is that moral praise and moral blame cannot be adjudged 
in the Hegel’s ethical framework. This is because the historical actors acted 
without possibly knowing why they did. The Absolute directed the course of 
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cosmic history through them without their self-consciousness. We cannot hold 
them responsible for their actions because they do not have absolute strength to act 
otherwise. The Hegel’s political leaders are subject to the control of the Absolute 
Spirit therefore, they cannot be held responsible for the actions since it is the 
Absolute Spirit that act through them.  
The citizens should, therefore, accept all laws, policies, and governmental 
decisions as the final projections from the Absolute Spirit, who is unquestionable. 
The leaders are only implementing the decisions of the Absolute, however, 
unknowingly. These political postulations gradually led to the emerging of tyrants, 
who consider themselves as nothing but helpless agents in the custody of the 
Absolute.  
Hegel’s exaltation of the State above the individuals and his justification of 
all social eco-political policies taken by the political leaders and the bureaucratic 
administrators as the arts of the Absolute’s instigation of cosmic history through its 
dialectic process are unpardonable. This is because the cruel leaders in African 
politics have emerged as tyrants who can be considered in the Hegel’s sense as 
historical figures under the usage of the Absolute’s adventure to cosmic 
development.  
 
THE STATUS OF THE AFRICAN STATES 
The early post-colonial African States experienced the emergence of 
tyrants who, possessing the Hegel’s concept of the State, used the power of 
governance at their own disposals to enriching themselves to the detriment of the 
citizens they were to govern. Through them, the State assumed a patrimonial and 
exploitative dimension. Their actions must not be revolted against because they are 
the ideal representatives of the Absolute Spirit. 
Nkrumah, the first independent African political leader, was the pride of 
the African continent after he rigorously led his country, Gold Coast (now Ghana), 
to independence on March 6, 1957. Not too long from the time of independence, 
Nkrumah’s reign of leadership began to assume tyrannical disposition in that he got 
critics and political opponents arrested and unfairly judged, until he was ousted in 
military coup.  Today, Nkrumah is referred to as the first African post-colonial 
dictator. 
Sekou Toure, the first president of Guinea, was another dictator that 
emerged in the post-colonial African continent. Toure held on to power from 1958 
until his uncelebrated death in 1984. 
Mobutu Sese Seko held the political power of Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo) for thirty-two (32) years. 
 
Zaire’s troops have been involved in the looting that has been 
taking place since September 1991 when the first waves of anti-
Mobutu demonstration swept the country. It might be argued that 
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Mobutu, as a civilian president, is not answerable for the 
misdeeds of his army. What is surprising about the whole Zairean 
episode is that the army, unlike in other parts of the African 
continent, has never posed a threat to the twenty-seven year old 
regime of Mobutu. While the melee would be going on in Zaire, 
Mobutu would be busy enjoying himself in a yacht (Echezona, 
1992) 
 
Bongo Omar ruled Gabon from 1967 until his death in 2009. On his 
demise, his son, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was installed as the president of Gabon. 
The present African States have transited from a tyrannical leadership to an 
exploitative leadership. The State in most post-colonial African societies has 
become a tool of personal acquisition of wealth by the political leaders. According 
to Williams (1977), the increasing intervention of the State in economic life has 
caused it to control lucrative contracts and the disposal of monopolistic advantages. 
Consequently, politics has become the primary source of capital accumulation by 
Nigerians. Through the political process, professional men, bureaucrats, and 
merchants were able to accumulate capital and carve out monopolistic advantages 
for themselves within the neo-colonial political economy, and thereby form a 
“bourgeoisie”. 
Jomo Kenyetta, the first prime minister and president of Kenya, also went 
down as one of the ruthless dictators in the history of the post-colonial African 
States. He appealed to ethnic loyalists and banned the opposition party. He led 
Kenya democratic process under one party system and was succeeded by Daniel 
Arap Moi, who continued in the line of the despotic and authoritarian path of 
Kenyatta.  
Gnasimgbe Eyadema of Togo ‘infused into the Togolese military, people 
of his ethnic group so that he was able to perpetuate himself in office for the past 
twenty-eight years’ (Echezona, 1992). 
These early African leaders and their accomplices rose as the minority, 
whose tenures of leadership were obvious displaced of tyrannical exercise of the 
governmental (State) power to the detriment of the common good or social good in 
which the majority (masses) participate. 
The political leaders who are the obvious representatives of the State and its 
institutions are immune by the law such that their nonchalant attitude towards the 
plight of people is obvious, even in the ongoing fourth Republic in Nigeria.  
Thus, Dukor (1991) describes the nature of the post-colonial Nigerian State 
this way: 
 
It is significant that the present Nigerian socio-economic 
formations are one of conflicts between the State and the society. 
The State, instead of being means of executing the will of the 
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people, becomes a representative of selfish, ethnic, and narrow 
interests and, inevitably becomes coercive machinery. The 
coercive and violent nature of the State suggests that there is an 
inherent weakness in the concept as bequeathed to us by the 
colonial masters (Dukor, 1991: 62-63).  
 
Given the advent of democracy in Africa, the contemporary African 
political leaders could not hold tenaciously to power, except for the few dictators. 
The African experience of the tyranny of the minority was with the early 
nationalists who took over power from the colonial masters. Their first hand 
understanding of politics and the State came from their experience with the 
colonial masters who used both politics and the State as coercive means of 
dictatorship and exploitation. These early African leaders seemed to have been 
exposed to the wrong concept of politics and the State as means of production 
instead of as means of providing a viable social order. The African experiences 
with military leadership worsen the State of the African post-colonial States. The 
military that were not trained in the art of dialogue imported warfare, which is the 
central theme in military into African politics. Democracy thrives on tolerance, 
negotiation, reconciliation and compromise which were variables African military 
leaders did not understand.  
Ake (1990) further buttressed these ideals of democracy when he argued 
that democracy implies precisely the assumption of differences to be negotiated, to 
be conciliated, to be moved into phases of higher synthesis. If democracy means 
anything at all, as a form of relationship, that is precisely what it means. If there is 
social pluralism that is in fact an argument for a democratic form of governance 
(Ake cited in Daddieh, 2002).                                                           
Democracy, ideally, implies negotiation and dialogue, while “militocracy” 
is predominantly an art of war and aggression. The military dictators, who were not 
trained in the art of negotiation and dialogue, seized State power and employed all 
coercive means of enforcing obedience on the people. 
Even the transition of the military governments to democratic government 
did not stop the abusive use of the State power conceived in the Hegel’s term as the 
central power under which all forms of power must be subjected. The minority 
(few leaders) maneuvered the State power of governance to the detriment of the 
well being of the majority. 
Zaire’s experience is very illuminating. According to Schatzberg (1997), 
Zairians are constantly victims of a society expressively organized with the sole 
goal of assuring a profit and maintaining the power of a minority through the 
limitation of rights and the exploitation of the largest number. 
This experience was the same for almost all post-independence African 
States. The minority, in the persons of the nationalists, and the military, who were 
the holders of political power in Africa, used such to the disadvantage of the socio-
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economic system of the State and the citizens. Now, the elites have hijacked the 
State power to the advantage of their own private pursues without paying attention 
to developmental ideologies.  
In Nigeria, for instance, no democrat/civilian government has been able to hold on 
to power tenaciously as some African countries have witnessed. However, Nigeria 
has been a victim of cruel, despotic, and corrupt military dictators. 
 
…The State of Nigeria is, in large part, a State of military 
dictatorship with a lengthy chain of decrees in its law book. 
Decreeism was born as soon as the first Nigerian military 
government emerged at the point of the crisis that rocked the first 
civilian government in 1966. The first military head of State, 
General Aguiyi-Ironsi, immediately after he came to power, 
surrounded himself and the State with protective decrees (Dukor, 
1991). 
 
The history of the Nigerian State has been the history of military 
dictatorship built around the Hegel’s State as the supreme body whose laws must 
be obeyed.  
 
RECONSTRUCTING THE STATE IN AFRICA 
The Hegel’s political theory granted a supreme power to the State 
(government). The State as the universal will of the Absolute Spirit assumes an 
unquestionable posture because the Absolute cannot be wrong in its decisions 
taken through the political leaders who are mere stooges in its hands. The political 
leaders cannot be wrong because they act according to the wills of the Absolute 
Spirit.  
The official position of this conception has been the basis of the 
exploitation and the dictatorship in the third world countries. The State should not 
have any goal than the provision of the platform that will aid the well being of the 
citizens. Even if the State cannot meet the needs of all its citizens, it must not 
destroy their means of meeting their own needs. It must provide the platform that 
will aid in the realizations of their own needs. The State must be development 
driven and sustainable development that entails the maintenance of holistic 
development. 
Ninalowo (1999) argued that part of the social contract between the State 
and the citizenry is for the former to provide an enabling environment and 
instrumentality for a range of cultural expressions. These would include liberal 
provision of educational, recreational, and aesthetic facilities. The orientation of 
the State as well as the civil society in this direction would enhance the realization 
of basic cultural needs. His reflection on the main task of the State buttresses the 
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point that the State is a driver of development and that the State has a responsibility 
to its citizens.  
Even if one would contest the reality of the social contract theory, the fact 
remains that the State exists for the welfare of its people. Contrary to Hegel’s 
postulation of the State, the State has no supreme existence far above the people 
who give it meaning. The Hegel’s State is a breeding ground for tyrants, and the 
African post-colonial State is an experiment of such. The only way to achieve this 
deconstruction is through demystifying the duo concepts of the State and of 
political leadership. The State exists for the people.  The political leaders are 
expected to be at the service of the people as their representatives.  
We must reconstruct the concept of the State as noted by Zaki Ergas as: 
 
A dominating organization controlled with varying degrees of 
efficacy by a ruling group which competes for power and 
compliance, for sovereignty, with other political, economic and 
social organizations both internally and externally. It is a partly 
autonomous, partly dependent structure of control (cited in 
Amuwo, 1988). 
 
The above definition portrays the Africans’ conception of the State. The 
State in Africa has fallen into the hands of the ruling elites (the minority), who 
compete vigorously for State’s power and use it for their personal financial 
advancement.  
The State is to make laws and enforce them through the use of its agencies 
and its political actors; however, the State is not just about making laws and 
enforcing them. The State has as one of its primary goals; the well-being of its 
people. This should be one of the goals of the peoples’ representatives (political 
leaders) and not just the initiations and the implementations of policies. All policies 
must have the peoples’ well-being as their goal.  It is true that the ‘demos’, also 
known as the people, cannot rule the State as the representatives of themselves; but 
their voices should not be ignored in governance.  
Schumpeter’s (1952) conception of democracy as ‘an institutional 
arrangement in which individuals acquire the power by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s votes’ promotes the idea that politics remain as the 
domain of the elites (the minority). For him, the possibility of mass participation is 
unrealistic. Therefore, the elites (the minority) should be allowed to wedge the 
State power of governance, while the majority demonstrates their involvement only 
in electing the so-called political leaders.  
Portis (1987) further shared Schumpeter’s sentiment by arguing that ordinary 
citizens do not and perhaps cannot have a sophisticated grasp of public policy and 
political affairs. For them politics is a little more than a morality play, where 
cultural clichés are affirmed and private frustrations vented. 
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This is, indeed, a radical postulation about politics. If the people are 
conceived as nothing but mere irrational objects to be ruled and dominated by the 
few educated elites, then the majority stands the chance of been exploited, 
dominated, and impoverished by those who hold the political power. This is the 
African political experience. The elites have been able to sidetrack the people from 
governance such that the people have no relevance in the policies that affect them. 
There is a need to deconstruct and reconstruct the concept of State in 
African politics. The State and its institutions, as operated by the political leaders 
and the bureaucrats, should not assume a magisterial position above the people for 
whom they are in power, whether elected, nominated, or selected.  The people 
should not be totally cut away from the government whose policies should enhance 
their (people) welfare. 
 
There is no difficulty in showing that ideally, best form of 
government is that in which the sovereignty or supreme controlling 
power in the last resort is rested in the entire aggregate of the 
community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of 
that ultimate sovereignty, but being at least occasionally called to 
take an actual part in the government by personal discharge of 
some public function local or general (Mills, 2004: 188). 
 
Even though Mills recognizes the fact that the whole community cannot be 
directly involved in governance, the point remains germane that the State 
(government) should not be ran without the inclusion of the people in the general 
decisions that affect them.   
The African States should avoid the Hegel’s patrimonial and absolutistic 
outlook and integrate the people into its holistic development project. In other 
words, the State, although under the direct control of the minority, should descend 
to the level of the majority by paying attention to them as the people whose 
collective existence gives room for the emerging of the State and its apparatuses. 
Nnoli (2006) underscored it thus: 
 
…the essence of true democracy is to be found, not in voting or 
representation, but rather in deliberation, while this argument does 
not discount totally the value of liberal attachment to institutional 
reform of governance or the requirement for pluralist constitution, 
it regards these ideals as insufficient in themselves for the 
grounding of democracy. Instead, it argues that the deliberative 
ideal looks to the creation of a community whose affairs are 
governed by the public deliberation of its members. This involves 
the cultivation of public spheres in which there is genuine dialogue 
between the agencies of public governance and those likely to be 
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affected by their decisions and actions….with popular democracy 
public authorities are expected to justify their actions, since 
governance is regarded as democratic only to the extent that the 
people individually and collectively enjoy a permanent possibility 
of contesting what government decides. 
 
This reflection on democracy is by implications relevant to the 
contemporary African States, given that Africa is undergoing a wider acceptance 
and agitation for democracy as an ideal form of government. The State should 
involve itself in adequate dialoguing with the people. The State’s actions through 
its leaders are to be justified; thus, this will enhance the possibility of 
accountability and transparency, which are the central missing factors in African 
politics.  
The reconstruction of the State entails the elevation of the people to the 
positions of occupying the central point of considerations in the initiation and 
implementations of the State’s policies. The leaders are not meant to lead without 
the consent of the people who will suffer the direct effects of their policies. The 
leaders are not to act as though the people are bundles of illiterates, apolitical, and 
unenlightened minds. This is the new ideal of the State that the post-colonial 
African societies need to evolve; a State that is primarily about the peoples’ well-
being; a State where the leaders are committed primarily to the peoples’ welfare 
and not just theirs. 
If the State is not committed to the peoples’ welfare, the people will not be 
committed to the welfare and the continuity of the State. For instance, Dukor 
(1991) argued that the people of Nigeria neither understand the sanctified 
institution of the State nor do they have any commitment to it. The Modern Nigeria 
State and its socio-economic formation lack an organic relation with the traditions 
of the people. It has not vibrantly integrated individuals, groups and institutions in 
such a way as to create polity expressing the aspiration of the people. 
The reconstructed State integrates and expresses the aspiration of the 
people. The African States should express the aspiration of the people in the 
societies. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE STATE, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
From the discourse above, it is obviously clear that the Hegel’s State 
produces the tyranny of the minority. This is because representative democracy, a 
widely accepted form of government, only gives room for the ‘demos’ to be 
represented by some few elites (minority) in the society. This further gives room 
for the elites to take advantage of the loopholes in the patrimonial and supremacy 
of the Hegel’s State. Also, the nature of the modern State will indeed prevent the 
‘demos’ from ruling themselves due to the population of the modern States.  
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Given all these, it is our general conclusion that the elites must fully 
integrate the people into the governmental processes in the State. Deconstructing 
and reconstructing the State in Africa will enhance the enthronements of the 
‘demos’ as the central figure in the government. The State and its institution of 
governance must first and foremost give cognizance to the people. This exercise of 
reconstructing the State is urgent if the African States will ever earn the respect of 
the international community in terms of development, which entails human 
development. 
According to Ade-Ajayi (1999), development is growth plus change. For 
him, change, in turn, is social and cultural as well as economic; the key concept 
must be improved quality of people’s life. 
The under development of the African continent can further be traced to 
the migration of its professionals whose wealth of knowledge could have led to the 
development of the continent. But since the State is exploitative and inhumane to 
the citizens, the African professionals seek greener pasture in foreign States that 
provide the platform for their self-realization and self-fulfillments. 
The African States should depart from this Hegel’s theory of the State and 
embrace good governance, which is defined as “the way in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development” (IrishAid, 2009). 
European Commission (2006) conceives governance as: 
 
…the State’s ability to serve the citizens. It refers to the rules, 
processes and behavior by which interests are articulated, 
resources are managed, and power is exercised in society. The way 
public functions are carried out, public resources are managed and 
public regulatory powers are exercised is the major issue to be 
addressed in that context. Governance is a basic measure of the 
stability and performance of a society. As the concepts of human 
rights, democratization and democracy, the rule of law, civil 
society, decentralized power-sharing and sound public 
administration gain importance and relevance, a society develops 
into a more sophisticated political system and governance evolves 
into good governance. 
 
The State is expected to serve its people through their representatives. 
Good governance is a product of non-violation of the peoples’ fundamental rights, 
equitable distribution of social goods, decentralized power-sharing, enthronement 
of the rule of law, proper management of public treasury, and etc.  
According to World Bank (2007), governance refers to the manner in 
which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape 
public policy and provide goods and services. 
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The ideals of sustainable development that Africa needs should not be 
made the responsibility of international institutions or organizations. This is 
because the State (government) is the main driver of governance; therefore, the 
burden of ensuring good governance, which will engender sustainable 
development, lies primarily on its shoulder.  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2008) Sustainable 
Development Report in Africa captures the following:  
 
Good governance is a sine qua non for development in Africa 
…good governance matters for economic development. Scholars 
have discovered that high-quality institutions have the power, over 
the long run, to raise per capita incomes and promote growth in all 
parts of the world. And the “development dividend” paid by good 
governance is large. Researchers estimate that when governance is 
improved by one standard deviation, incomes raise about three-fold 
in the long run, and infant mortality declines by two-thirds. Donor 
agencies, too, have concluded that development assistance is more 
effective in countries with good institutional quality. Increasingly, 
international financial institutions and some bilateral donor 
agencies, subscribing to evidence-based policy and decision-
making, explicitly tie aid transfers to governance outcomes. The 
growing recognition of the link between good governance and 
successful development has stimulated demand for monitoring the 
quality of governance across countries and within individual 
countries over time.  In fact, the ability to measure and monitor 
progress on key dimensions of governance such as the rule of law, 
corruption, and voice and accountability already has enabled 
reformers in government and civil society to press for 
improvements in the quality of governance in many countries. 
 
The African States should pursue good governance, which will invariably 
lead to sustainable development.  
For Elliot (1999), sustainable development in the future will require a 
commitment to overcoming poverty through a focus on the welfare issues of the 
poorest sectors of society, particularly in the developing countries. Their 
environmental concerns and their development needs, in stark contrast to ‘wealthy’ 
or ‘Northern’ priorities, are associated with securing the most basic levels of 
economic and social well-being. 
This gives us an insight into what sustainable development demands from 
the African States. The new proposal for the African States is not that of assuming 
a magisterial position over the citizens, but that of engaging in the pursuit of 
sustainable development, which entails total commitment to the welfare of the 
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masses by providing a conducive environment for the realization of the self-
fulfillments and meeting the welfare needs of the people. 
On a final note, the voice of reason compels us to join force with the 
critical submission of Laski (1967) that every government must submit itself to the 
judgment of those who feel the consequences of its acts. The reason for such 
submission is the simple historical fact that unconditional power has always 
proved, at least ultimate, disastrous to those over whom it is exercise. 
This implies that the people should form the central point in governance. 
Government’s activities should center on the people given that they are at the 
receiving end of all policies formulated and implemented in the society. 
Additionally, absolute power, in the hand of the leaders, could be a weapon of 
oppression and suppression of the people. Therefore, it should be discouraged. 
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